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Chapter 4
Body Politics: Revolt and City Celebration
Matthew Crippen
1 Introduction
This chapter endeavors to articulate somaesthetic forms of expression occur-
ring irrespective of knowledge of the philosophical movement. To this end, it 
focuses on Mandalay’s Water Festival and Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring, 
which stand as illustrations. These events do so, first, because they exemplify 
bodily and therewith experiential coordination around urban structures; sec-
ond, because they are instances of somatic refashioning, for example, through 
creative conversion of injuries into celebratory badges of dissent; and, third, 
because they organize around cultural and political concerns, giving them 
emotional and hence visceral dimensions. Directed almost therapeutically 
towards life-improvement – whether implicitly or explicitly – these celebra-
tions and protests also have meliorative aspects that mark the somaesthetic 
movement.
Somaesthetics is notable for drawing upon a diversity of approaches. These 
range from pragmatism to existential phenomenology to Eastern meditative 
practices to ancient Greek philosophy to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work,1 which 
in fact approximates the aforesaid American and continental schools in its 
later phases.2 A thread common to these traditions is that all offer embodied 
accounts of human experience. Somaesthetics shares this view, which is more 
than just the trite claim that the body is necessary for experience; it is to main-
tain that the body – in combination with things it encounters –  constitutes 
 experience. This happens in even relatively simple encounters, as when our 
fingers coordinate around a bottle, with the structure of our hand and the 
1 See Richard Shusterman, “Somaesthetics: A Disciplinary Proposal,” Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism 57, no. 3 (1999): 299–313; Richard Shusterman, “Back to the Future: Aesthetics 
Today,” The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics 23, no. 43 (2012): 104–124.
2 Nicholas Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgen-
stein, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1981); Richard Shusterman, Body Consciousness: A Philosophy of Mindfulness and Somaesthet-
ics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. Ch. 4; Shaun Gallagher, “Philosophi-
cal Antecedents of Situated Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion of Situated Cognition, 
ed. Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 35–52.
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 entity grasped shaping what we can do and hence what we experience.3 A sec-
ond distinguishing feature of the movement is its emphasis on everyday aes-
thetics. In this, it builds on forerunners, especially John Dewey. Only whereas 
Dewey highlights aesthetics as an outcome of everyday somatic engagements, 
somaesthetics emphasizes the body as an everyday expressive medium. A third 
characteristic of somaesthetics is its life-improving trajectory. This is of course 
common to philosophy from ancient times onwards. However, somaesthetics 
stands out by drawing on practices such as yoga, Zen and athletic disciplines 
to advocate hands-on somatic interventions, albeit not in opposition to mental 
ones since the body is a constituting structure of mind.
All of this is emphasized in Mandalay’s Water Festival and Cairo’s Arab 
Spring, which can be conceived as varieties of living somaesthetic practices. In 
addition to this, these events highlight the largely shared nature of experience. 
Consonant with this, Richard Shusterman’s model of somaesthetics challenges 
essentially private, internal conceptions of experience as wrongheaded turns 
in modern Western thinking. Unfortunately, meditative disciplines encour-
aging self-focus on breath, listening to one’s inner voice and other forms of 
introspection, some of which Shusterman draws on, open his work to misin-
terpretations along the lines just mentioned. Pragmatic and phenomenologi-
cal notions of experience as “culture” or “world” offer a corrective.4 Though it 
sounds odd, we in fact use these terms interchangeably, as when talking about 
parenting culture or the world or experience of parenthood. Since cultures and 
worlds are here spheres of handling in which bodily capacities, habits and sen-
sitivities synchronize around practical dealings, these conceptions simultane-
ously point to the somatic character of experience. This, in turn, captures the 
celebrations and revolts in Mandalay and Cairo, including their political and 
social dimensions. It does – and this is the central point I want to defend – 
because these events take hold as a kind of creative somatic dance in which 
activities and therewith experiences synchronize around surroundings, while 
3 See Matthew Crippen, “Body Phenomenology, Somaesthetics and Nietzschean Themes in 
Medieval Art,” Pragmatism Today 5, no. 2 (2014): 40–45; Matthew Crippen, “Embodied Cog-
nition and Perception: Dewey, Science and Skepticism,” Contemporary Pragmatism 14, no. 1 
(2017): 121–134.
4 See John Dewey, “Syllabus: Types of Philosophical Thought” [c. 1922–1923], in The Middle 
Works, 1899–1924, vol. 13, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1983), 352–395; John Dewey, “Unfinished Introduction” [c. 1951], in The Later Works, 1925–1953, 
vol. 1, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 361–364; 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time [1927], trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1962); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
[1945], trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962).
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also pushing into them, leading to bodily and cultural-physical meliorative 
refashioning.
2 Evolving Concepts of Experience
The view that experience is essentially private follows from the notion that 
it is formed out of internal representations. This outlook has become com-
monplace in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience, even if it is considered 
edgy in everyday life and movies such as The Matrix and Inception. Against this, 
somaesthetic thinkers, pragmatists, and phenomenologists have all worked to 
highlight public forms of embodied experience. In doing so, some have re-
turned to the ancient idea that having experience means being experienced or 
skilled.5 This claim has etymological basis, for the Greek word experiri “means 
try, to put to the test.”6 Empeiros means “experienced or practiced in an activ-
ity, grounded in peira, trial or attempt,”7 and consequently inculcated out of 
habitual routines distilled from the past. This agrees obviously with concep-
tions advanced in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics.8 It resonates 
also with Plato if the emphasis on intelligent skill is subtracted.9 Since skills are 
gained in social contexts, these ancient notions simultaneously imply a public 
concept of experience. Reinforcing this is the fact that there are few references 
to inner experience, for example, in Homer’s epics, where the ability even to 
outwardly convey emotions while not feeling them is treated as an exceptional 
phenomenon.10
5 See John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt, 1920); John Dewey, 
Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court, 1925); Martin Heidegger, “The Statement of 
Protagoras” [1940], trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in vol. 4 of Nietzsche, vols. 3 and 4, ed. David 
Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 91–95; also see Shusterman, “A 
Disciplinary Proposal,” 302; Shusterman, “Thinking Through the Body,” 7–9.
6 Joseph Lennon, “The Notion of Experience,” Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 23, 
no. 3 (1960): 315–343.
7 John Dewey, Philosophy and Education in Their Historic Relations [c. 1910–1911], tran-
scribed by Elsie Ripley Clapp, ed. J.J. Chambliss (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 133.
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKe-
on (New York: Random House, 1941), 981a7–9; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. G.R.G. 
Mure, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, 99b35–100a8.
9 Plato, Gorgias, trans. W.D. Woodhead, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Ham-
ilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 463b–465b; 
Plato, Laws, trans. A.E. Taylor, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, 720a.
10 Hubert Dreyfus, “Existential Phenomenology and the Brave New World of the Matrix,” 
The Harvard Review of Philosophy 11, no. 1 (2003): 18–31.
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To the extent that experience is accordingly not hidden in the head and 
instead embedded and embodied, it is public, so that Shusterman urges that 
“body, mind, and culture are deeply codependent.”11 Shusterman and others 
such as Dewey accordingly object to exclusive emphasis on inner, private ex-
perience, along with the isolated individualism that goes with it. There is, to be 
sure, a fruitful side to this view, namely, that individuals – as opposed to the 
state, aristocratic powerbrokers or God – have greater jurisdiction over them-
selves. Dewey appreciates this, writing that the “modern discovery of inner ex-
perience, of a realm of purely personal events that are always at the individual’s 
command” and there “inexpensively for refuge” is a “liberating discovery.”12 It is 
so because it “implies a new worth and sense of dignity in human individual-
ity,” this “in contrast to the ancient scheme of experience, which held individu-
als tightly within a given order subordinated to its structure and patterns.”13 For 
reasons discussed, however, Dewey thinks the position overplayed. Elaborating 
on the shift from pre-modern to modern views, he notes that from the stand-
point of the latter, experience developed into that which greets the senses. 
It thereby became perception of the new and ceased to be sedimented habits 
binding us to the past.14 Grasped as sensory impressions, moreover, these more 
recent concepts oriented experience as a phenomenon occurring within an 
internal mental theater, leading to “the subjectivistic, solipsistic and egotistic 
strain in modern thought.”15 This was opposed to the ancient idea of experi-
ence as a product of publically shared customs and skills.
Though not a majority position, another shift began to take hold in the 
late Modern period, with some deemphasizing inner experience. A number 
of scholars did so by arguing that a great deal of human life is pre-reflective, 
which is to say, just at or below the limits of consciousness. Pragmatists, psy-
choanalysts and existential phenomenologists were early defenders of this po-
sition.16 Variations of the view also have traction in contemporary psychology.17 
11 Shusterman, “Thinking Through the Body,” 2.
12 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 172.
13 Ibid., 172–173.
14 See Dewey, Philosophy and Education, 133.
15 Dewey, Experience and Nature, 173.
16 For example, William James, “Are We Automata?” Mind 4, no. 13 (1879): 1–22; Friedrich 
Nietzsche, The Gay Science, revised edition [1887], trans. Walter Kauffman (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974); Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” [1915], trans. James Strachey 
and Anna Freud, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, vol. 14, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1957), 159–215; Heidegger, 
Being and Time, esp. §12–24; Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, throughout.
17 Luís M. Augusto, “Unconscious Knowledge: A Survey,” Advanced Cognitive Psychology 6, 
no. 1 (2010): 116–141.
0004399201.INDD   92 6/2/2019   10:09:05 AM
93Body Politics: Revolt and City Celebration
205599
But while standard contemporary psychological interpretations tend to credit 
pre-reflective or unconscious activity to vast neural recesses, and although this 
supplies a partial account, additional explanations lie in the extent to which 
non-neural bodily and worldly structures enable cognition and perception.
Dewey, once again, was an early proponent of this view, arguing that per-
ception is sensorimotor organization in the world and hence not an event oc-
curring exclusively in our heads.18 Thus, for example, tactile perception of a 
bottle is not just sensory excitation. Instead, it is the way our hand adjusts to 
roundness and the manner in which our fingers glide smoothly over a surface 
that does not bite flesh. The point is given empirical backing and extended by 
work on sensory substitution devices where head-mounted cameras deliver 
stimulation to the skin or tongue, and people actively exploring their sur-
roundings rapidly acquire an analogue of vision.19 This is not just an argument 
about perceptual experience, however. Cognition is also embodied. Thus in 
the case of smartphones, most “know” the keyboard in use and not reflection, 
and could not draw a diagram of its layout from memory.20 A non-human case 
in point is the remarkable multi-generational, group migrations of monarch 
butterflies, which occur partly through the funneling effect of mountains, and 
thus through interactions between bodies and environments.21
These views, insofar as they are embodied, connect closely to the idea of 
experience as cultural. An initial point to note is that group coordination is the 
norm throughout the biological realm. Migrating birds interlock to match ve-
locity, maintain proximity and avoid collision.22 They also coordinate flapping 
to either maximize upwash capture or minimize downwash effects.23 Dung 
beetles similarly coordinate, interacting with gravitational forces, friction and 
one another to roll dung into balls very rapidly over significant distances.24 In 
some cases, integration is encompassing, with trees communicating through 
18 John Dewey, “The Reflex Arc in Psychology,” Psychological Review 3, no. 4 (1896): 357–370.
19 Paul Bach-y-Rita and Stephen W. Kercel, “Sensory Substitution and Augmentation: Incor-
porating Humans-in-the-Loop,” Intellectica 2, no. 12 (2002): 287–297.
20 Matthew Crippen, “Intuitive Cities: Pre-Reflective, Aesthetic and Political Aspects of Ur-
ban Design,” Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology 3, no. 2 (2016): 125–145.
21 Matthew Crippen, “Dewey, Enactivism and Greek Thought,” in Pragmatism and Embodied 
Cognitive Science: From Bodily Interaction to Symbolic Articulation, ed. Roman Madzia and 
Matthias Jung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 233–249.
22 Craig Reynolds, “Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model,” Computer 
Graphics 21, no. 4 (1987): 25–34.
23 Steven J. Portugal et al., “Upwash Exploitation and Downwash Avoidance by Flap Phasing 
in Ibis Formation Flight,” Nature 505, no. 7483 (2014): 399–402.
24 Matthew Crippen, “Group Cognition, Developmental Psychology and Aesthetics,” Prag-
matism Today 8, no. 1 (2017): 185–197.
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chemical and auditory signals and behaving almost as single organisms by 
nourishing one another.25 Something comparable occurs with bacteria, re-
garded by some as a genetic and functional super-organism.26 On a less grand 
but equally compelling scale, multiple organisms join to form the Portuguese 
man o’ war to the point that it appears as a single jellyfish-like creature.
Critical to all this is that in working together, organisms do not just build 
themselves. They build living spaces, whether in the case of networked tun-
nels, hills and food caravans constructed by ants or the cities erected by human 
beings. In the case of humans, we start as dependent creatures and remain so 
throughout life, a condition that only changes in degree. Our coming together, 
joining and coordinating in groups, moreover, is a form of world-building, not 
just in biological ways, but also in cultural manners. John Steinbeck (1939) ex-
presses this beautifully in an almost Heideggerian passage about the mass mi-
grations of the Great Depression:
In the daylight they scuttled like bugs to the westward; and as the dark 
caught them, they clustered like bugs near to shelter and to water…. [T]
hey huddled together; they talked together; they shared their lives, their 
food, and the things they hoped for in the new country. Thus it might be 
that one family camped near a spring, and another camped for the spring 
and for company, and a third because two families had pioneered the 
place and found it good…
In the evening a strange thing happened: the twenty families became 
one family, the children were the children of all. […] In the evening, sit-
ting about the fires, the twenty were one. They grew to be units of the 
camps, units of the evenings and the nights. A guitar unwrapped from 
a blanket and tuned – and the songs, which were all of the people, were 
sung in the nights. Men sang the words, and women hummed the tunes.
Every night a world created, complete with furniture – friends made 
and enemies established… Every night relationships that make a world, 
established.27
While emphasizing shared hopes and emotional concerns as organizing prin-
ciples, Steinbeck also stresses that worlds need a “certain physical pattern.” In 
his example, this might include “water, a river bank, a stream, a spring, or even 
25 Peter Wohlleben, The Hidden Life of Trees, trans. Jane Billinghurst (Berkeley: Greystone 
Books, 2016).
26 Sorin Sonea and Maurice Panisset, A New Bacteriology (Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 1983).
27 John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath (New York: Viking Press, 1939), 264–265.
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a faucet unguarded,” along with “enough flat land to pitch the tents, a little 
brush or wood to build the fires.”28 Cities require more, of course, though wa-
ter, space for shelter and fuel are basic amenities that have gotten many off the 
ground.
Instances of world-building can be more immediate, but the basic pattern 
remains the same. Thus, for example, a weekend-world of revelry may organize 
around a concern for wine and sociality. While this typically involves verbal 
coordination, it also entails intricate synchronizations of bodies around one 
another and things. This, in turn, connects weekend revelry to overtly physical 
coordinations in the vein of the earlier discussed synchronization of hand and 
bottle that realizes smoothness, roundness and other properties. The nighttime 
world of the migrants follows suit insofar as it gathers around shared concerns 
for water, companionship, tent space and hopes for a better life. The agricul-
tural, industrial and commercial worlds, not to mention the physical space, of 
wine-producing communities might likewise cohere around concerns for that 
commodity. This illustrates some of what Heidegger conveys when he remarks 
that “the Old High German word thing means a gathering, and specifically a 
gathering to deliberate on … a contested matter.” As such, “the Old German 
words thing and dinc become the names for an affair or matter of pertinence.” 
They accordingly “denote anything that in any way bears upon men, concerns 
them.”29 In this passage, Heidegger emphasizes contested matters as subjects 
for debate. He stresses that this is also captured in the Latin expression res 
publica because the first element of the compound can be translated as entity, 
thing or affair, with the second part pointing to public, political or cultural 
concerns. At the same time, most public discourses also occur through the 
non-verbal language of bodies coordinating around each other and environ-
mental contours, for example, chairs and the layout of a room. Heidegger thus 
adds: “The thing things world,”30 a point emphatically emphasized by the ways 
that the worlds of the migrants, revelers and wine-producing communities all 
gather around particular concerns.
The foregoing accordingly emphasizes the codependence of lived space, 
concerns, experience and culture. Wine is a crafted item, for example, a physi-
cal and cultural product. It is simultaneously made what it is by the ways in 
which it stands as an object of concern or importance in our worlds. It might be 
a commodity in the world and experience of the shopkeeper; in the reveler’s, a 
28 Ibid., 266–267.
29 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” [1949], In Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
 Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 172.
30 Ibid., 178.
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social lubricant; and for the chemist, a mix of compounds.31 The concerns that 
make wine what it is for us accordingly depend on cultural and physical worlds 
and vice versa. This is to broaden Shusterman’s claim about the codependence 
of body, mind and culture, and is one of the central points that I will argue 
Mandalay’s Water Festival and Cairo’s Arab Spring demonstrate.
3 Somatic Organization in Mandalay
Taken together and applied to Mandalay, the account so far offered suggests 
that the city’s Water Festival not only synchronizes around physical space, 
but also organizes around codependent cultural concerns. The relevance of 
cultural concerns simultaneously points to the political and social situation 
of the country. A former British colony, Myanmar has in recent times been 
one of the more isolationist and iron-fisted regimes. The situation is evolving, 
however, with slackening media censorship, opening tourism and the country 
experiencing its first multi-party election in decades in 2010.32 Despite these 
developments, Myanmar is not a bastion of free expression, and while more 
egregious violations exist, broadcasters avoid televising Mandalay’s Water Fes-
tival. They instead focus on tamer events in Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw, a secretly 
built city and the new capital since the mid-2000s.33 The military, moreover, 
retains much control.34 Predominately Buddhist, religious xenophobia is also 
rampant against minority Christians, Hindus and especially Muslims. Even the 
politician Aung San Suu Kyi – former darling of the West and Nobel laureate – 
stands accused of neglecting abuses against Muslims and purging them from 
her party.35 Such abuses are longstanding, though they have only received 
widespread attention with the recent spate of genocidal activity against Mus-
lims, particularly the Rohingya.36
31 William James, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” Mind 4, no. 15 (1879): 317–346.
32 Nehginpao Kipgen, Myanmar: A Political History (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2016), esp. Ch. 5.
33 Dulyapak Preecharushh, “Myanmar’s New Capital City of Naypyidaw,” in Engineering 
Earth, ed. Stanley D. Brunn (Berlin: Springer, 2010), 1021–1044.
34 Kipgen, throughout.
35 For an account of abuses against religious minorities, see Francis Wade, Myanmar’s En-
emy Within (London: Zed Books, 2017).
36 Often regarded as among the least violently disposed religions, Buddhist scriptures are 
more pacifistic than other major world religions, so the idea of Buddhist monks rampag-
ing and inciting violence in Myanmar seems incongruous. A partial explanation is that all 
citizens of this religion are strongly encouraged to give a year to monkhood in childhood 
and again in adulthood. In effect, therefore, many are draftees, as opposed to educated 
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While Myanmar boasts ancient civilization, Mandalay – comprised of 
roughly a million people and nestled in the middle of the country along the 
Irrawaddy River – is relatively young. A past capital, it arose in circumstances 
similar to the current one, namely, at the behest of the ruler in 1857. Construc-
tion of Mandalay Palace commenced the same year, and it forms a centerpiece 
that is enormous relative to the city.37 Square in shape, four walls encase it, 
each measuring about 2 km, followed concentrically by moats and wide streets, 
with webs of narrower lanes spreading beyond the palace throughout the city. 
With its ample moats, this functional and sentimental heart of the city offers 
ready sources of water. The latter is essential to the festival, which involves 
mass dousings, carried out in playful fun and ritualistic cleansing for the Bud-
dhist New Year.38
The word “catharsis” captures much of what occurs during the festival. The 
word comes from the Greek kathairein for “cleanse,” and, in addition to ritual-
istic cleansing, the playful pandemonium seems a creative catharsis against a 
historically repressive regime that normally restricts even public assembly.39 
During the roughly weeklong celebrations, people splash others in streets, on 
passing motorcycles, through open windows of trains and vehicles (and also 
from them). Though the Water Festival is celebrated nationally, Mandalay car-
ries the festivities to an extreme that would be illegal in most jurisdictions, 
especially around the palace. Here, so much water is launched from pumps in 
canals that the flooding in some areas mimics a natural disaster. Though no 
serious damage is done because the water drains at night, it gets deep enough 
during the day that cars stall and children are able to swim naked in some por-
tions of the streets and drainage trenches leading to canals.
devotees. This lack of enthusiasm is combined with a population that has recently gone 
from having limited to widespread internet access, with little experience sifting reliable 
news from junk. Facebook has also become a primary source of information, with hate 
speech propagated there taken as fact. Though religious tensions were lower when popu-
lations were united against military oppressors, Wade (cited above) argues that today’s 
problems are partial artifacts of past British rule, which introduced an ethnic taxonomy 
for administrative purposes. This hardened once-fluid boundaries between different 
populations, and some groups that were previously accepted as indigenous are now per-
secuted as outsiders.
37 For the early history of Mandalay and the palace, see V.C. Scott O’Connor, Mandalay, and 
Other Cities of the Past in Burma (New York: Appleton and Company, 1908), esp. Ch. 1.
38 See Maung Htin Aung, Folk Elements in Burmese Buddhism (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2009), 
Ch. 3; Hsin-Chun Tasaw Lu, “Festivalizing Thingyan, Negotiating Ethnicity: Burmese 
 Chinese Migrants in Taiwan,” Journal of Burma Studies 12, no. 1 (2008): 29–62.
39 See Kipgen, esp. Ch. 5; also see “Burma: Events of 2017,” Human Rights Watch, https://
www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/burma.
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Mandalay’s Water Festival is esteemed as the nation’s wildest, and a decisive 
factor is the city’s structure. The palace, with its water-filled moats, is centrally 
located and encompasses a significant portion of the city. The celebration ra-
diates throughout the city, with people soaking others from buckets, bottles 
and pumps drawing from the many canals and ponds in Mandalay or some-
times from water mains. That said, the chief force gathers and synchronizes 
around the palace, paralleling the way hands coordinate around entities, and 
 Steinbeck’s migrants coordinate around faucets, tent space and other people. 
During the Water Festival, less global bodily coordinations occur as well, be-
cause walking on flooded versus dry ground, for example, mobilizes different 
gaits, or because variations between gentle trickles, quick splashes, torrents 
from hoses or nothing at all generate different postures and body motions, and 
hence different experiences.
This account may appear to overstress physical structure and underem-
phasize culture, but the two are intertwined. Indeed, Steinbeck’s earlier Great 
Depression example frames world-building as culture-generation, while si-
multaneously laying weight on requisite physical patterns. In his example, this 
includes things such as firewood, water and flat space for tents. Though af-
fairs are not so schematic, one can imagine Mandalay’s Water Festival taking 
similar form. Perhaps one group came for the water in the moat and because 
it had been a good gathering place at some point in the past; maybe in follow-
ing years others joined for like reasons, and also seeking company. Merchants 
may have increasingly erected booths, and others set up stages for cultural per-
formances. A world may have accordingly gathered, with its own patterns of 
bodily activity and hence experience.
All of this augments earlier claims about the interdependence of body, 
mind and culture. Of the body, William James (1905) writes:
The world experienced … comes at all times with our body as its center, 
center of vision, center of action, center of interest. … So far as “thoughts” 
and “feelings” can be active, their activity terminates in the activity of 
the body, and only through first arousing its activities can they begin to 
change those of the rest of the world. The body is the storm center, the 
origin of coordinates, the constant place of stress in all that experience-
train. Everything circles round it, and is felt from its point of view.40
Although these remarks may seem to contradict Steinbeck’s and Heidegger’s 
observations about activity and therewith experience gathering around things, 
40 William James, “The Experience of Activity,” Psychological Review 12, no. 1 (1905): 9.
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both of their accounts hearken back to the human bodily center, even if im-
plicitly. They do because things such as firewood, flat space for tents and water 
are not identifiable as such outside the sphere of human concerns or interests, 
of which the body is the center. Moreover, insofar as concerns are emotional, 
they tend towards the visceral and in this sense bodily, more so because they 
originate in somatic motivations such as thirst and thermoregulation.
In light of this, concerns in Mandalay and the rest of Myanmar warrant 
more attention. Some concerns specifically echo Steinbeck’s example, as with 
the desires for water, space, and company that characterize the celebrations. 
The last of these may be accentuated by shared hardships faced in Myanmar, 
also mirroring Steinbeck’s account, and by the ambiguous feelings that locals 
have toward Mandalay Palace stemming from the forced labor used to restore 
the site within living collective memory. Military authorities, moreover, in-
scribe their power by posting signs at exterior points reading: “Only when the 
army is strong will the nation be strong” or “The tatmadaw [army] and the 
people cooperate and crush all those harming the union.” This arguably adds 
to collective frustration, perhaps exacerbated because only military and gov-
ernment officials enjoy entry during the festival. Hence, while it is embedded 
in the city’s heart, the palace is cut off and distant. As in religious gatherings, 
however, the water and canals consecrating the festival bridge some of the dis-
tance, pulling the palace and the city into each other’s neighborhoods. Its role 
in the Water Festival accordingly shares similarities with gods in religious cere-
monies, which we never see face-to-face and seem both remote and proximate.
Another obvious desire – in fact related to creative cathartic impulses of the 
Water Festival – is simply that of having fun. Some of this is part and parcel 
of daily life. Thanaka, a pale-yellow paste made from ground bark and said to 
protect against the sun, shows up in creative patterns across faces, and a blood-
red mixture of paan – made of betel leaf, areca nut, slaked lime and sometimes 
tobacco – stains many teeth. However, this is not particular to the festival, but 
the norm throughout the year. Other occurrences are particular, with most of 
the country, including public transport and many shops, closing for the multi-
day celebration. People appear to enjoy the anonymity of crowds, dressing in 
everyday ways but sometimes wearing Guy Fawkes masks, which are associ-
ated with revolt. This seems part of a larger urge to misbehave and lose control 
in a kind of Dionysian rupture, albeit as a way of ameliorating oppressive con-
ditions and thereby seizing some control.
This losing of control takes many forms, some innocent, some less so. First 
and foremost, it includes dousing others and getting drenched, with children 
taking especial relish as they soak passing motorcycles, pedestrians, people 
through train windows, and others. This behavior inverts normal  authority 
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structures since children target adults. Adults also participate by soaking 
 others or playfully closing metal slots over glassless train windows to block wa-
ter barrages. The mass pandemonium contains another inversion of authority 
and acting out insofar as the regime normally restricts mass assembly. These 
inversions also encompass conventional misbehaviors such as public drinking 
and sharing bottles with random strangers, sometimes between vehicles and 
pedestrians and vice versa. At the more extreme end, theft occurs, with at-
tempts on tourists not uncommon in densely packed areas around the palace. 
Travel literature claims that theft is rare in Myanmar, citing penalties involving 
hard labor. In Mandalay it appears to be confined to the palace area during 
the festival, presumably because crowds afford safety and opportunity, but the 
thievery is also keeping with moral inversions characterizing the celebration.
So these are how some basic concerns unfold and how the Water Festival 
at the palace organizes them. Interestingly, the palace also answers concerns 
of government officials by confining the festivities’ main force to a definite 
location, with songs, dances and other cultural displays seemingly restricted 
to official stages surrounding the palace area, which is cleared after certain 
times of night. It is as if government officials see a need to let people act out a 
little and vent emotions, while simultaneously not wanting frustrations to boil 
over. In line with this, corporate entities construct large elevated stands along 
the canal, presumably with government consent. Here, attractive, fashionably 
dressed youth mechanically bob to blaring dance music, spraying people with 
restrained trickles, in contrast to the firehose-like rushes delivered at informal 
pumping stations.
From the standpoint of maintaining control, the release-valve afforded by 
the festival may be important because people in Myanmar – while habitu-
ated to political oppression – are not especially accustomed to regulation on 
the level of everyday life, which is informal and in this sense arguably freer 
than in the West. Such informality is common in other impoverished regions – 
 including Egypt – because the poor often depend on it for everyday necessi-
ties and governments lack the wherewithal to suppress it. Yet it varies between 
countries, with Myanmar on the high extreme. For example, food venders greet 
trains rolling into stations, with some engaged in activities impermissible in 
the West. These include walking with kettles of samosas boiling in oil, heated 
by coals in the base, assuredly without formal license. Venders also travel on 
trains, preparing and selling food, leaving carriages and returning later to re-
trieve dishes. Passengers can sleep or sit on the floor of trains or under seats if 
they can fit. They can dangle feet from openings, puffing cigars despite copious 
“No Smoking” signs, and police on the train are unperturbed. Separate from the 
military, unarmed and informal too, police often remove uniforms to evade the 
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heat once trains are in motion. None of this is a problem. Random motorcycles 
often pull up, offering rides for negotiated prices. Three or four people and chil-
dren can pile on, and no one finds it problematic. This everyday informality is 
a pre-condition of the wildness of Myanmar’s celebrations and arguably of the 
government allowing them within limits as a public release.
The informality of the celebration and of the culture supply many possi-
bilities for aesthetic experience, and not just because of all the fun, though 
it helps. The strolling, ducking, splashing and dousing integrate into rhythms 
of doing and undergoing. The creative acting out, the unexpected events, the 
twists and turns, combined with physical and emotional strain and the relief 
that follows, add tension and repose. All of this binds incidents that would 
 otherwise remain loosely connected, while making individual moments mani-
fest more sharply. The aesthetic coherence of experience is enhanced if there 
is a pivotal moment – even an ugly one such as a theft – that reorients and 
holds everything together the way a climax does for a play. Under these condi-
tions, the events of an hour, day, or the better part of a week may integrate like 
a narrative, forming an aesthetic whole or what Dewey calls “an experience.”41
An overarching cultural factor summing up most of what has been said is 
the celebration’s origins in religious ceremonies consecrated with water. Ety-
mologically, the word “religion” connotes a kind of binding together, and the 
palace and moats are loci around which things bind. This recollects Heidegger’s 
later work, which speaks about jugs and wine chalices gathering people and 
worlds, while also emphasizing shared religious and consecrating aspects.42 
This suggests a more complicated, cultural version of basic sensorimotor co-
ordinations, thus reinforcing somaesthetic, pragmatic and phenomenological 
stress on the interdependence of body, mind and culture. Only in this case, 
activity and experience organize around the palace and moats. In some ways, 
the palace simultaneously constrains celebrations, a point also captured by 
the idea of binding. After all, the Water Festival involves being constrained or 
bound by what bodies and available environments allow and disallow. Limits, 
in turn, supply a kind of world grammar that makes coherent experience,43 
along with aesthetic form, possible. At the same time, the Water Festival in-
volves being controlled by the regime. Yet this is arguably what motivates some 
of the creative acting out, so that the festival is simultaneously a venue for 
41 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch and Company, 1934), esp. Ch. 3.
42 Heidegger, “The Thing,” 163–180; Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” [1951], 
in Poetry, Language, Thought, 143–159.
43 See Matthew Crippen, “William James on Belief: Turning Darwinism against Empiricistic 
Skepticism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46, no. 3 (2010): 477–502.
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losing control and an avenue for seizing it back from an oppressive regime. In-
triguingly, therefore, this Buddhist festival can be seen as the inverse of a good 
many Buddhist meditative practices insofar as it entails losing self-mastery. 
This loss of mastery, however, introduces a modicum of life-bettering control, 
thereby realigning it with meliorative practices of the religion, doing so, more-
over, in richly somatic ways.
4 Somatic Dimensions of Cairo’s Protests
Enacted against oppressive conditions and Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian 
government, the Arab Spring in Tahrir Square adds to the account so far of-
fered. It does so by exemplifying artistic, somatic self-refashioning. In some 
cases, refashioning is minor, as with demonstrators’ use of face paint. In  others, 
it is more radical, as with people creatively reworking injuries into badges of 
dissent. Shusterman calls such practices “representational somaesthetics,” and 
the category includes everything from surface adjustments achieved through 
makeup, cosmetic surgery, bodybuilding, hairstyling and dieting to external 
exhibitions of power and skill.44 Representational displays are not inevitably 
expressions of vanity, but instead can converge with “experiential somaes-
thetics,” here encompassing practices such as athletics and yoga that make 
“us feel better in both senses of that ambiguous phrase: to make the quality 
of our somatic experience more satisfying and also to make it more acutely 
perceptive.”45 For such reasons, representational and experiential somaesthet-
ics overlap with a third category. This is performative somaesthetics, focused on 
“building strength, health, or skill,” and including activities such as athletics.46
Egypt’s Arab Spring began on January 25, 2011 as a demonstration against po-
lice brutality, but it broadened into a mandate expressed in the slogan: “bread, 
freedom, social justice, and human dignity.”47 The specific date was chosen be-
cause it marked Police Day, a holiday ironically commemorating the death or 
injury of police officers who stood against British occupiers. Deplorable eco-
nomic conditions had been percolating in Egypt for decades, and a number of 
44 See Shusterman, “A Disciplinary Proposal,” 299–313; “Thinking through the Body: A Plea 
for Somaesthetics,” 1–21.
45 Ibid., 15.
46 Ibid., 16.
47 Andrea Teti and Gennaro Gervasio, “The Unbearable Lightness of Authoritarianism: Les-
sons from the Arab Uprisings,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2 (2011): 321–227; Marlies 
Glasius and Geoffrey Pleyers, “The Global Moment of 2011: Democracy, Social Justice and 
Dignity,” Development and Change 44, no. 3 (2013): 547–567.
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specific incidents ignited the revolutionary powder keg. One of these included 
the beating of Khaled Siad, a man in his 20s murdered by police in public view 
while begging for mercy, the unprovoked attack repeating what had become 
commonplace. The heart-wrenching images of his mangled face that circulat-
ed on protest pages with phrases such as Kullena Khaled Siad – meaning “We 
are all Khaled Siad” – might be regarded as a somaesthetic display for world-
bettering purposes and cathartic release.48
Though protests combusted throughout Egypt, Tahrir was the sentimental 
and functional heart, and as it happened my initial encounter with that space 
occurred on my first day in Cairo proper. It began with a stroll along the Nile, 
with the tips of the Giza Pyramids poking above the northern horizon. Before 
going to Tahrir, a colleague took me to Maadi, which appeared normal except 
for tanks and soldiers and the lack of heavy bustle characteristic of Cairo. We 
next poked our heads up from a metro station in Garden City, assessing safety. 
From there we wandered on foot to Tahrir. Approaching from a side-street, we 
saw burnt cars and other wreckage that scarred the way, and tension increased 
as we neared some barricades. No violence marred this day, and a carnival-like 
atmosphere met us upon entering the square, accompanied by relief and mild 
elation. At the same time, unease about potential violence and surveillance 
remained, heightening the awareness of bodily vulnerability.
The organization of people in the square was remarkable. They themselves 
handled security, patting people down at makeshift checkpoints and examin-
ing ID, presumably in efforts to repel plainclothes security. Inside the square, 
protesters had built a little world, complete with food, water, tea and tents 
pitched for those refusing to leave. An audio system blared music and chants. 
Along the perimeter, a woman – middle or upper class to all appearances – 
stood atop a pedestal for utility equipment, weeping and clutching a news-
paper with photos of dead protesters. More toward the center, a man dressed 
in business attire was immersed in conversation, with a small Egyptian flag 
in the shape of a crest hanging from his neck. His face and head were heavily 
bandaged and his arm in a sling. Though clearly for medical purposes, the man 
seemed to proudly display his dressings as insignias of dissent.
Throughout the square, people waved flags and paraded placards, often 
perched on light poles, one of which had an effigy of Mubarak hanging from 
48 For a history of Egypt’s Arab Spring, see Ashraf Khalil, Liberation Square: Inside the Egyp-
tian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012); Matthew 
Crippen, “Egypt and the Middle East: Democracy, Anti-Democracy and Pragmatic Faith,” 
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 35, no. 2 (2016): 281–302; Jack Shenker, The Egyp-
tians: A Radical Story (New York: The New Press, 2016).
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a noose in an artistic display. Most of the placards were haphazard shreds of 
cardboard, with Arabic captions such as “Don’t let your revolution be stolen” 
or “The people’s rights will not be lost regardless of delays” or “I don’t think 
Mubarak has a TV,” this time in English. One man crouched above a battered 
green electrical box, partly hidden behind a ragged tower made from pieces 
of cardboard. He appeared poor, an impression affirmed by the uneducated 
Arabic scrawled across his construction, cursing the government. To drive the 
point home, he added an outward facing shoe – viscerally insulting in the Mid-
dle Eastern world – to his makeshift work of protest art. Welcoming pats on 
backs were given, and paper Egyptian flags handed out, an emblem interpret-
ed at the time as a banner of dissent. On the edge of the square was a torched 
police van, overflowing with trash. Much of it was bagged, so protesters living 
in Tahrir presumably had converted the van to a makeshift dumpster, while si-
multaneously expressing distain for police. Soldiers and a tank were stationed 
just outside the square, the latter strikingly covered with graffiti.
This brief description is distilled from emails sent during the 18-day span 
that became known as the January Revolution, which was before I heard about 
somaesthetics. Nonetheless, it captures the representational, experiential, and 
performative aspects of the discipline. Instances of representational somaes-
thetics are obvious, whether by the man proudly displaying his injuries or peo-
ple painting flags on their faces. In addition to altering outward appearances, 
these actions exhibited strength. Embodied, artistic, performative aspects like-
wise manifested in the weeping woman stalwartly clutching photographs of 
the dead, or with the man posing like a statue, holding together his corrugated 
edifice. One can speculate that these somatic performances supplied cathartic 
release for those engaged in them and were accordingly experiential as well. 
Cathartic and hence meliorative experiential dimensions of these bodily- 
artistic displays were also there insofar as they were part of the collective hope 
and optimism of that period, even if it turned out to be short-lived and naive. 
The grief that came with this time and its aftermath, moreover, was an affirm-
ing reminder of the compassion that most carry, along with the human will for 
bettering life circumstances.
The role of the flag in the protests is worthy of more attention. As opposed to 
Western protest practices of defacing flags, Egyptians co-opted theirs – already 
a sign of unity – as a coordinating symbol of dissent against ruling authorities. 
This joint display of dissent kept with the living, collective cultural-historic 
experience of Egyptians and indeed the square, which hosted celebrations af-
ter the 1952 Egyptian Revolution that toppled King Farouk and ejected British 
occupiers. In the decades that followed, the square sporadically became a pro-
test space, with the most prominent demonstrations occurring in  January and 
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 February of 2011 and reoccurrences afterwards up until the summer of 2013. 
With their shared past, Liberation Square and the Liberation Flag –  Tahrir 
being Arabic for “liberation” – received their official names just after the 1952 
Revolution.49 The Egyptian flag’s design was a variation of the broader pan- 
Arab pattern. Many Middle Eastern flags follow this blueprint, introduced by 
the British diplomat Mark Sykes as a revolt symbol against the Ottoman rul-
ers.50 This is ironic since it later was the banner under which Arabs ejected 
Western powers.
The historic status of the flag – which mirrors that of the square – was argu-
ably part of what led it to become a central symbol of dissent, although flags 
without revolutionary histories were central in Arab Spring protests elsewhere. 
In all cases, however, flags shared a role, namely, coordinating existing national 
unity to cement public exhibitions of solidarity. Egyptian organizers unequivo-
cally saw things this way, asking protesters to display flags and avoid signs of 
specific religious or party allegiance.51 Painted on faces, incorporated into plac-
ards and clothing, handed out in the square and waved by the masses there, 
flags saturated the square during the protests that toppled Mubarak. In one 
dramatic display, men stood once again like sculptures in a representational-
performative-experiential exhibition, holding flags propelled upwards from air 
rushing from subway vents, silhouetted against an angry-looking grey sky.
Perhaps the most striking exemplification of representational- performative- 
experiential somaesthetics, however, was that of Ahmed Mohamed Ali, a for-
mer dentist, better known as Ahmed Harara. “Harara” is Arabic for “heat,” and 
the appellation was given because of his eagerness in heated situations. During 
a January 2011 clash on a bridge leading to Tahrir, a shotgun blast left Harara 
temporally comatose and destroyed the vision in his right eye. In November of 
the same year, he lost his left eye from a second gunshot, again near Tahrir. 
Undeterred, Harara turned these injuries into protest art. At times, he has worn 
a prosthetic eye, inscribed with the Arabic word , pronounced horiya and 
meaning “freedom.” He is also known for his roughly worked metal eye  patches, 
etched with the dates on which he was shot,   A ٢٨ and a ١٩ or January 28 
and November 19. These surface representations show strength, but they also 
do more. In the context of interviews and public appearances, they become 
forms of performance art. Being consequences of fervent  commitment to the 
49 Lloyd C. Gardner, The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of 
Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak (New York: New Press, 2011), Ch. 1.
50 Elie Podeh, The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2011), Ch. 2.
51 Wael Ghonim, Revolution 2.0 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).
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to the revolutionary cause and expressing an almost Nietzschean way of cheer-
fully dealing with its painful consequences, these representations of individual 
and collective resolve are also experiential in Shusterman’s sense.
Though I already described my own experience in Tahrir during the uprising, 
which was also aesthetic and bodily in Dewey and Shusterman’s senses, a criti-
cal point is worth adding: I am uncertain whether I stood within the bound-
aries of the square. Indeed, what most encountered in the news and hence 
regarded as Tahrir was not the physical space of Tahrir, which has a diameter 
of less than 100 meters. It was instead Tahrir plus the surrounding area that was 
filled with protesters, and the fact that people defined that larger revolution-
ary space as Tahrir connects the Tahrir experience to that of Mandalay’s Water 
Festival. Steinbeck notes that a physical pattern is needed for world-building, 
and this was true for Tahrir in 2011, just as it is during Mandalay’s yearly water 
celebrations. The protest space centered around Tahrir Square and included 
the congested roads surrounding it, all of it hemmed in by buildings, many of 
which are representations of state. One of these is the Mogamma, famous as 
a maze of government bureaucracy. The Egyptian Museum also overlooks the 
square, as did the ruling party’s headquarters until it was burned in 2011 and 
demolished in 2015. At the functional heart of the city, Tahrir also abuts Sadat 
Station, a nexus in the metro system. The square is likewise a hub for major 
streets and Qasr El Nil Bridge, a prominent landmark linking downtown Cairo 
to Zamalek Island, one of the most affluent areas in the city. While the physical 
pattern was requisite, the 2011 uprising was a cultural event, defined largely by 
bodies in streets and Tahrir. But more than this, pre-existing cultural factors 
made Tahrir a central place of concern. Among these was the fact that the 1952 
Egyptian Revolution that finally ended British rule and toppled King Farouk 
was celebrated in the square and marked the time it was given its name. This 
led to the erection of representations of state around it, and these made it a 
good place to express dissent against rulers. Because it was a national symbol 
of liberation, leaders were likely all the more motivated to clear it to maintain 
spurious ownership over the ideologies it represents. But it was also a symbol 
of rebellion, so protesters were likely all the more motivated to revolt and hold 
the space to protect these same ideologies.
Thus while the centrality and physical space afforded are part of what led 
people to gather there, this protest – like most others – was not just about hold-
ing space. Though capturing Tahrir was unquestionably important and added 
momentum in 2011, the battle was – and continues to be – preeminently about 
values and attempts to own and re-shape them. Tahrir Square accordingly is 
not and was not defined by its official boundaries, but by mutually constitut-
ing interactions between people, physical space and culture. This points again 
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to Steinbeck’s and Heidegger’s notions of world-building. By virtue of pointing 
to world-building, Tahrir – like Mandalay’s Water Festival – also highlights the 
codependence of somaesthetic experience, politics, and culture in city life.52
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